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INTRODUCTION 
Lawson, Heidrick, and Soular (LHS) present three criticisms in regard to Johnson-Flanigan-
Weeks' (JFW) study "An Empirical Investigation of the Costs of Adopting No-fault Insurance 
Systems: 1971-1980," Journal of Insurance Regulation, December 1983. The JFW study found 
that no-fault has the effect of increasing the cost of automobile insurance. The purposes of this 
comment are to respond to the LHS criticisms and to present support for the conclusion of the 
previous study. 
 
OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
First, LHS fault JFW for omitting independent variables—specifically no- fault threshold levels 
and no-fault benefit levels. A number of independent variables were controlled: population 
density, price level, and fatalities per vehicle registration. The nature of this type of social 
science research is that neither the presence nor the level of all experimental factors can be con-
trolled for except in an ex-post facto, quasi-experimental fashion. The authors did not intend to 
imply that the impact of all factors were being controlled. Indeed, JFW recognized and 
acknowledged that factors, such as political and legal climates, speed limits, oil shortages and 
environment, may account for premium cost behavior. However, there is no reason to believe 
that these variables are highly correlated with the type of reparation system, and therefore, no 
reason to believe that their presence or absence would affect conclusions about the impact of the 
reparations system or premium costs. 
 
LHS present evidence of the significance of thresholds on the cost of no-fault. The reader is 
cautioned to note that their evidence is a comparison between actual costs and estimates of what 
cost would have been. JFW used actual data throughout and arrived at the conclusion that the 
cost of the reparation system is higher in states that adopt no-fault. JFW used Insurance Services 
Office's data 1971-1980 for 47 states and employed the tricotomy: true no-fault, add on no-fault, 
and optional no-fault after the Insurance Information Institute classifications.
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 Even setting this 
issue aside, the reader should note that LHS' evidence about thresholds and benefit levels does 
not invalidate the JFW findings. 
 
JFW compared the cost of automobile reparation systems and found that no-fault is associated 
with higher costs. LHS merely elaborate upon the JFW classification scheme effectively 
explaining that some of the reasons no-fault, add-on, or optional no-fault costs more is because 
of the presence of varying threshold and benefit levels. The fundamental JFW conclusion stands: 
no-fault costs more. LHS elaborate but reinforce the conclusion. 
 
LHS' conclusion is that all states are different. JFW grouped states based on reparation system 
classifications and made inferences. The statistical support was strong for the conclusion that 
states can expect marginal cost increases when adopting no-fault. 
 
SELECTION BIAS 
The second criticism has to do with selection bias and again the appropriateness of cross-
sectional analysis altogether. LHS suggest states most likely to adopt no-fault are those already 
suffering high growth in insurance costs. Thus, LHS argue, the high cost states selected no-fault 
as a cost reduction strategy and, not surprisingly, still showed up high cost. LHS suggest that the 
appropriate strategy is to study the growth and level of insurance costs before and after adoption 
of no-fault. 
Five states changed to no-fault during the period of time encompassed in the original Johnson-
Flanigan-Weeks (1971-1980) study and had complete data available from the ISO.
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 These states 
include Georgia, Kentucky, Hawaii, Colorado (which changed to no-fault) and Arkansas (which 
changed to add-on). 
For each of these states, the arithmetic average of the annual increases over the previous year in 
pure premiums was calculated for: (1) the period before the change to no-fault and (2) the period 
after the change to no- fault. Table 1 presents these before and after averages of annual changes 
in pure premium. 
Table 1  
ANNUAL CHARGES IN PURE PREMIUM 
 Average of Average of 
Year Changed Annual Charges Annual Charges 
To No-fault Before After 
Georgia 1974 - 89 11.93 
Kentucky 1974 - 53 7.30 
Hawaii 1973 1.14 14.53 
Colorado 1975 4.88 8.20 
Arkansas 1974 -.09 2.60 
 
Two implications come readily from perusal of Table 1. First, there is no basis for LHS' 
assumption of selection bias. Clearly it is not true, at least in terms of growth rates, that those 
states which adopted no-fault "had the highest and most rapidly growing costs prior to no-fault." 
Three of the five states had average annual rates of change that were negative. Second, it is clear 
the average of the annual rates of change is higher after than before. 
LHS point to the hazard of cross-sectional analysis—namely, it is impossible to allow for all 
possible contaminating factors. On the other hand, the hazard of time series analysis is the 
possibility of adducing causation to the wrong underlying trend. Cognizant of this, similar 
calculations were undertaken for all states that did not adopt no-fault for the appropriate years 
before and after each of the five states presented above. The data is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
ANNUAL CHARGES IN PURE PREMIUMS FOR STATES  
WITHOUT NO-FAULT 
 
Year Changed  
to No-fault 
Average of  
Annual Charges  
Before 
Average of  
Annual Charges  
After 
Georgia 1974 -.89 11.93 
22 States  3.35 9.28 
Kentucky 1974 -.53 7.30 
22 States  4.64 8.83 
Hawaii 1973 1.14 14.53 
22 States  5.80 7.49 
Colorado 1975 4.88 8.20 
22 States  5.80 7.49 
Arkansas 1974 -.09 2.60 
22 States  5.80 7.49  
The reader is reminded that part of the uniqueness of the JFW study is that it covers the entire 
decade. Lilly and Webb had much more complete data but did not reach back as far.
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 The ISO 
data had the advantage of greater duration but approximately 4 percent of the data was missing. 
Unfortunately, only the five no-fault states noted above are available in complete form. 
However, the results are consistent across these five states and with those found when analyzing 
those states without complete data. 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The third LHS criticism has to do with the regression model. LHS correctly point out that 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the error terms in the regression model probably exist 
and, if so, reduce the efficiency of the regression coefficients estimates. The regression 
coefficients are still unbiased and consistent even if the usual tests of statistical significance are 
no longer valid." While the parameter estimates may be imprecise because of these problems, the 
results of Tables 1 and 2 seem to indicate these statistical estimation problems do not affect the 
JFW conclusion that no-fault increases the cost of automobile insurance. 
CONCLUSION 
LHS fault JFW on other independent variables, selection bias, and regression analysis. This 
comment effectively rebuts each of these. The process leads the writers not only to reiterate but 




1. 'Insurance Facts, various years. over the 1970-80 decade tracks the development of 
no-fault. 
2. The reader will recall that JFW used ISO data 1970-80; using the pooled regression tech-
nique if a data point, a year's observation, was missing, the state did not necessarily have to 
be discarded; in the time series analysis, full data is required; consequently, the states of 
Delaware, Missouri, South Dakota and Virginia are discarded because of one or more years 
of missing data. 
3. See, Claude Lilly and Bernard Webb, "No-fault: A Review of Its Cost," 2:2, Journal of 
Insurance Regulation, December, 1983. 
